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Abstract
Diffusion auction is a new model in auction de-
sign. It can incentivize the buyers who have already
joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale in-
formation to others via social relations, whereby
both the seller’s revenue and the social welfare
can be improved. Diffusion auctions are essen-
tially nontypical multidimensional mechanism de-
sign problems and agents’ social relations are com-
plicatedly involved with their bids. In such auc-
tions, incentive-compatibility (IC) means it is best
for every agent to honestly report her valuation and
fully diffuse the sale information to all her neigh-
bors. Existing work identified some specific mech-
anisms for diffusion auctions, while a general the-
ory characterizing all incentive-compatible diffu-
sion auctions is still missing. In this work, we
identify a sufficient and necessary condition for
all dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC)
diffusion auctions. We formulate the monotonic
allocation policies in such multidimensional prob-
lems and show that any monotonic allocation pol-
icy can be implemented in a DSIC diffusion auction
mechanism. Moreover, given any monotonic allo-
cation policy, we obtain the optimal payment policy
to maximize the seller’s revenue.
1 Introduction
In traditional auctions, the bidders are given no incentives to
spread the sale information to others since they are in perfect
competition. This not only ends the sale with a low revenue,
and even worse, may lead to an inefficient allocation. For
instance, suppose a seller is selling an item on eBay. Visitors
who browse the sale may join in the sale and put their bids.
The strike price of the item depends on the number of bidders
and their posted bids. In order to involve more participants
in an auction, the seller can advertise the sale via sponsored
search or social media, etc. However, if the advertisements
do not bring any buyers valuable enough, the investment on
the advertisements could probably be wasted.
∗corresponding author.
To tackle this problem, a new thread in auction design
which is called diffusion auction comes to the fore. This kind
of auction mechanisms can incentivize the early joined partic-
ipants to share the sale information to the uninformed individ-
uals via, for example, online social networks. [Li et al., 2017]
initiated this problem in the scope of social networks. They
showed that the classic VCG mechanism [Vickrey, 1961;
Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973] can be directly extended to the
social network setting, but the seller may suffer a loss by
implementing this mechanism. To overcome the low rev-
enue problem, they proposed the information diffusion mech-
anism (IDM) which is not efficient but guarantees the seller’s
revenue. In some particular economic networks, efficiency
and revenue could both be guaranteed by a natural market
model called customer sharing mechanism [Li et al., 2018].
[Li et al., 2019] further identified a class of diffusion mecha-
nisms for any unweighted graphs, and IDM is a special case
in this class with the lowest revenue. They also established a
mechanism for weighted graphs.
All of the above-mentioned auctions are specific cases of
incentive-compatible (IC) diffusion auctions. Nevertheless,
general characterizations of incentive-compatible diffusion
auctions are still missing in the literature. The most obvious
advantage of incentive-compatible mechanisms is that they
are easy for the participants to play and easy for the designer
to predict the outcome. Moreover, according to the reve-
lation principle [Myerson, 1979], although honest reporting
may not be the only Nash equilibrium, it is without loss of
generality to focus on incentive-compatible mechanisms. For
diffusion auction design, since each buyer can only share the
auction information to some subset of her neighbors, the ar-
gument form that is used to prove the revelation principle also
holds. In this work, we characterize a sufficient and necessary
condition for incentive-compatible diffusion auctions. We
prove that naturalmonotonic allocation policies can be imple-
mented in dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility (DSIC).
We also derive the payment policy with respect to a given
monotonic allocation policy. Moreover, given any monotonic
allocation policy, we also obtain the optimal payment policy,
i.e., the one that maximizes the seller’s revenue.
The characterization of incentive-compatibility can
be traced back to value monotonicity [Myerson, 1981]
and is later rediscovered by [Archer and Tardos, 2001].
Value monotonicity has been widely used to ob-
tain incentive-compatible mechanisms for single-
parameter domains where each agent’s preference
over outcomes can be captured by a single param-
eter [Archer and Tardos, 2001; Briest et al., 2005;
Auletta et al., 2004; Andelman et al., 2005; Kova´cs, 2005].
A generalization of value monotonicity into arbitrary do-
mains is cycle monotonicity [Rochet, 1987]. However, cycle
monotonicity is overly complicated and is rarely applied to
argue incentive-compatibility. It is known that for convex
domains, cycle monotonicity can be replaced by a simpler
condition, called weak monotonicity [Lavi et al., 2003;
Bikhchandani et al., 2006; Shmoys and Tardos, 1993]. But
even this simpler condition does not have much application in
IC mechanism design for multidimensional problems. When
the domain of preferences is unrestricted and there are at
least three possible outcomes, [Roberts, 1979] shows that the
only incentive-compatible mechanisms are variations of the
VCG mechanism. In the diffusion auction scenario, besides
posting in a bid, each bidder is allowed to strategically diffuse
the sale information to others. Therefore, this is a nontypical
multidimensional problem where one domain is the bid and
the other domain could be any subset (even an empty set) of
edges of a graph. As we will show in the following parts,
value monotonicity is not suffice to incorporate diffusion
incentives and we develop new techniques for analyzing the
incentive-compatibility of diffusion auctions.
Section 2 formulates the basic model of diffusion auction.
Section 3 provides a general characterization of incentive-
compatible diffusion auctions. In Section 4, we elaborate on
a class of natural allocation policies and derive the optimal
payment policies for such allocations.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a digraph G = (N,E), where N is the node set
and E is the edge set, assume there is a seller s ∈ N who
wants to sell an indivisible item. Each node i ∈ N \ {s}
refers to a potential buyer and each pair of nodes can com-
municate through an edge in E. The most typical examples
of such graphs are social networks where each person can
only directly communicate with her neighbors, e.g., friends,
relatives. Initially, only the seller’s neighbors are informed
of the sale. A node can participate in the sale if and only if
one of her neighbors is aware of the sale and further invites
her to join the sale. The seller wants to incentivize the early
participants to share the sale information to the uninformed
nodes, whereby all nodes in the graph can join the sale. This
can not only increase the seller’s revenue, but also improve
the allocation efficiency. For convenience, we define N−s as
N \ {s} and call a node in N−s a buyer.
The above problem can be modeled as an auction. For-
mally, denote ti = (vi, ri) by buyer i’s privately known type,
where vi is her valuation of the item and ri is the set of all her
direct neighbors. Denote t = (t1, · · · , tn) by the type pro-
file of all buyers and t−i = (t1, t2, · · · , ti−1, ti+1, · · · , tn)
by the type profile of all buyers except i, i.e., t = (ti, t−i).
Let T = ×Ti∈N−s be the type profile space of all buyers,
where Ti = R≥0 × P(N) is buyer i’s type space and P(N)
is the power set of N . Since ti is private information, i can
strategically misreport to affect the outcome if it is beneficial
to her. Let t′i = (v
′
i, r
′
i) ∈ Ti be the reported type of buyer
i where r′i ⊆ ri means that i diffuses the sale information
to a subset r′i of her neighbors. Since buyers can not diffuse
information to a non-existing neighbor, we have r′i ∈ P(ri).
Denote t′ = (t′1, · · · , t
′
n) by a feasible reported type profile
of all buyers, where feasibility requires that t′i = nil if i has
never been informed of the sale or she decides not to join the
sale. We only consider feasible reported type profiles.
Definition 1. A diffusion auction mechanism M = (pi, x)
on graphG consists of two components: an allocation policy
pi = {pii}i∈N−s and a payment policy x = {xi}i∈N−s , where
pii : T → {0, 1} and xi : T → R are the allocation and
payment functions for i, respectively.
Given buyers’ reported type profile t′, pii(t
′) = 1 means
that i gets the item, while i does not get the item if pii(t
′) = 0.
xi(t
′) ≥ 0 indicates that i pays the seller xi(t′), and i re-
ceives |xi(t′)| from the seller if xi(t′) < 0. We say an alloca-
tion policy pi is feasible if for all t′ ∈ T ,
∑
i∈N−s
pii(t
′) ≤ 1,
and if pii(t
′) = 1, then t′i 6= nil. That is, a feasible allo-
cation can only allocate the item to at most one participant.
Let Π be the set of all feasible allocations. In what follows,
we only consider feasible allocations. Given an allocation
policy pi and a reported type profile t′, the social welfare of
an outcome is define as W (pi, t′) =
∑
i∈N−s
pii(t
′)v′i. An
allocation policy pi∗ is efficient if for all t′ ∈ T it always
maximizes W (pi∗, t′). Since there is only one item for sale,
efficient allocation implies the highest bidder gets the item.
Definition 2. An allocation pi∗ is efficient if for all t′ ∈ T ,
pi∗ ∈ argmaxpi′∈ΠW (pi
′, t′).
Given buyer i with truthful type ti = (vi, ri), a reported
type profile t′ and a mechanism (pi, x), the quasilinear util-
ity of i is defined as: ui(ti, t
′, (pi, x)) = pii(t
′)vi − xi(t′).
We say a diffusion auction is individually rational if for each
buyer, her utility is non-negative when she truthfully reports
her valuation, no matter to which subset of neighours she dif-
fuses the auction information and what the others do.
Definition 3. A diffusion auction mechanism (pi, x) is indi-
vidually rational (IR) if ui(ti, ((vi, r
′
i), t
′
−i), (pi, x)) ≥ 0 for
all i ∈ N−s, all r′i ∈ P(ri), and all t
′
−i ∈ T−i.
In diffusion auctions, IR ensures that no matter how a buyer
diffuses the information, as long as she honestly reports her
value, she will not suffer loss. Besides IR, now we define the
incentive-compatibility (IC) as: for each buyer, reporting her
true valuation and, meanwhile, fully diffusing the sale infor-
mation to all her neighbors is always a dominant strategy, no
matter what the others do.
Definition 4. A diffusion auction mechanism (pi, x) is
incentive-compatible (IC) if ui(ti, (ti, t
′
−i), (pi, x)) ≥
ui(ti, (t
′
i, t
′′
−i), (pi, x)) for all i ∈ N−s, all t
′
i ∈ Ti, and all
t
′
−i ∈ T−i.
Note that on the right-hand side of the inequality, (ti, t
′
−i)
is replaced by (t′i, t
′′
−i). This is because if i does not spread
the auction information to all her neighbors, then some buyers
who can receive the information under ti, may no longer be
able to receive it. Thus under t′i, the feasible type profile of
buyers except i is changed from t′−i to t
′′
−i.
Now we formulate the diffusion auctions’ criteria with re-
spect to the seller. Given a reported type profile t′ and a dif-
fusion auction mechanismM = (pi, x), the seller’s revenue
generated byM is defined as the sum of all buyers’ payments
RevM(t′) =
∑
i∈N−s
xi(t
′).
Definition 5. A diffusion auction mechanismM = (pi, x) is
(weakly) budget balanced if for all t′ ∈ T , RevM(t′) ≥ 0.
Over the past few years, following similar models as the
above, several diffusion auction mechanisms have been pro-
posed, while a general theory for diffusion auctions is miss-
ing. In the following sections, we will establish such a theory
to fill the gap.
3 Incentive-Compatible Diffusion Auctions
We say an allocation policy pi is implementable if there is
a payment policy x such that the mechanism (pi, x) is IR and
IC, and say it is value-monotonic if a winner cannot become a
loser by increasing her bid. Given a value-monotonic alloca-
tion policy, there exists a critical bid for buyer i, above/below
which i wins/loses the item, i.e., each buyer’s critical bid is
the minimum bid that makes her win.
The most simple scenario is that seller s connects to all
buyers in N−s. Since the seller knows all buyers in advance,
it reduces to the traditional single-item auction design. Gen-
eral theories for this case have been well developed. Many
well-known works [Myerson, 1981; Lehmann et al., 2002;
Archer and Tardos, 2001; Mu’Alem and Nisan, 2008] show
that a normalized mechanism (i.e., losers always pay zero)
for single-parameter domains is IC if and only if its alloca-
tion policy is value-monotonic, and the winner pays exactly
her critical bid. The most well-know theory for this case is
Myerson’s Lemma [Myerson, 1981].
Theorem 1 (Myerson’s Lemma). Fix a single-item auction
environment without information diffusion.
(a) An allocation policy pi is implementable if and only if it
is value-monotonic.
(b) If pi is value-monotonic, then there is a unique payment
policy x for which (pi, x) is IR and IC and the winner
pays her critical bid and the losers pay zero.
However, Myerson’s Lemma does not apply in our general
setting. First of all, although critical bid is a powerful tool
of characterizing the payment policy in traditional auctions,
the characterization of it is not straightforward in diffusion
auctions. In single-parameter domains, critical bid is well
defined as a positive number depending only on other bid-
ders’ bids. For example, in the second price auction, each
bidder’s critical bid equals the highest bid of the other buyers
which is not affected by herself. Unfortunately, this argument
is no longer valid in diffusion auctions, since any buyer i now
can affect others’ report t′−i through strategic diffusion. Sec-
ondly, the losers’ payoffs in a diffusion auction can be posi-
tive and can vary from one bidder to another [Li et al., 2019].
In diffusion auctions, any buyer i’s diffusion strategy can
affect the allocations. Given any r′i ⊆ ri there is a minimum
winning bid for buyer i. That is, each buyer i’s critical bid
should be a function of her diffusion strategy r′i. Define the
critical bid in diffusion auctions as follows.
Definition 6. Given an allocation policy pi and other buyers’
reports t′−i, buyer i’s critical bid with respect to r
′
i ⊆ ri is
v∗i (r
′
i) = argminb′i∈R≥0{pii((b
′
i, r
′
i), t
′
−i) = 1}.
Note that under some special allocation policies, a buyer
cannot win no matter what she does. An immediate evidence
is the ’unlucky players’ identified in [Li et al., 2017]. It is
a special class of buyers who cannot affect the allocations
no matter how high they bid and which subset of neighbors
they diffuse the sale information to. Whenever in these cases,
set v∗i (r
′
i) = ∞ for all r
′
i ⊆ ri. Whether such buyers exist
is jointly determined by the structure of the graph and the
designed allocation policy.
For single-item auctions, a buyer either wins the item or
not. Hence, a buyer’s payment policy xi(t
′) can be de-
coupled into two components: the payment for winning
the item xi(t
′|pii(t′) = 1) and the payment for losing it
xi(t
′|pii(t′) = 0). Let x˜i(t′i, t
′
−i) = xi(t
′|pii(t′) = 1) and
xi(t
′
i, t
′
−i) = xi(t
′|pii(t′) = 0), respectively. The following
proposition is straightforward from this definition and will be
very useful to explore the underlying structures of diffusion
auction design.
Proposition 1 (Payment Decoupling). Given a mechanism
(pi, x), for all i and all t′−i, the payment for i can be decou-
pled as xi(t
′) = pii(t
′)x˜i(t
′
i, t
′
−i) + (1 − pii(t
′))xi(t
′
i, t
′
−i).
We call x˜ and x the decoupled-payments from x. To sim-
plify the notations, the term t−i, t
′
−i will be omitted when
analyzing a specific buyer i. In the following definitions and
lemmas, we will characterize several properties that any IC
diffusion auction should possess, and then in Theorem 2 we
will further prove that these properties are also sufficient for
any diffusion auction to be IC. We first extend the traditional
value-monotonicity into diffusion auctions.
Definition 7 (Value-Monotonic Allocation). An allocation
policy pi for a diffusion auction is value-monotonic if for
any t′ and any buyer i with pii((v
′
i, r
′
i), t
′
−i) = 1, we have
pii((v
′′
i , r
′
i), t
′
−i) = 1 when v
′′
i ≥ v
′
i.
It means that for any buyer i, once her diffusion action is
fixed as r′i and all the other buyers’ reports are fixed as t
′
−i,
then her allocation is monotonically increasing over her bid
v′i. In other words, given t
′
−i and r
′
i, then i wins the item if
and only if v′i ≥ v
∗
i (r
′
i). We now prove that any incentive-
compatible diffusion auction should have value-monotonic
allocation.
Lemma 1. If a diffusion auction (pi, x) is incentive-
compatible, then pi is value-monotonic.
Proof. Proof by contradiction: assume there exists an IC dif-
fusion auction and pi is not value-monotonic. This means
there are two values v2i > v
1
i such that pii((v
1
i , ri), t−i) = 1
but pii((v
2
i , ri), t−i) = 0. Denote the payments for buyer
i with types t1i = (v
1
i , ri) and t
2
i = (v
2
i , ri) by x˜i(t
1
i ) and
xi(t
2
i ), respectively. Recall that x˜i is i’s payment for win-
ning and xi is her payment for losing. If v
1
i − x˜i(t
1
i ) ≥
−xi(t2i ), then buyer i with losing type t
2
i should misreport
t1i since v
2
i − x˜i(t
1
i ) > v
1
i − x˜i(t
1
i ) ≥ −xi(t
2
i ); similarly, if
v1i − x˜i(t
1
i ) < −xi(t
2
i ), then buyer i with winning type t
1
i
should misreport t2i to lose. Since there always exists a ben-
eficial deviation, then the diffusion auction cannot be IC and
the assumption is false.
We next extend the traditional value-independent payment
into diffusion auctions based on the payment-decoupling in
Proposition 1.
Definition 8 (Bid-Independent Decoupled-Payments). The
two decoupled-payments from x are bid-independent if for all
t
′
−i, all i and i’s two different reports (v
′
i, r
′
i) and (v
′′
i , r
′
i), we
have x˜i(v
′
i, r
′
i) = x˜i(v
′′
i , r
′
i) and xi(v
′
i, r
′
i) = xi(v
′′
i , r
′
i).
The payment for i consists of the two decoupled-payments,
thus if both of them are bid-independent, then the payment for
i is also bid-independent. This covers the property of pay-
ment in traditional single-item auctions. We now prove that
any incentive-compatible diffusion auction should have bid-
independent decoupled-payments.
Lemma 2. If a diffusion auction (pi, x) is incentive-
compatible, then the decoupled-payments of x are bid-
independent.
Proof. Given a buyer i and t−i, for any two winning types
t1i = (v
1
i , ri) and t
2
i = (v
2
i , ri) wheremin{v
1
i , v
2
i } ≥ v
∗
i (ri),
assume for a contradiction that x˜i(v
1
i , ri) 6= x˜i(v
2
i , ri),
then buyer i with t1i would misreport t
2
i when x˜i(v
1
i , ri) >
x˜i(v
2
i , ri), and buyer i with t
2
i should misreport t
1
i when
x˜i(v
1
i , ri) < x˜i(v
2
i , ri). Therefore, for the winning buyer,
her payment x˜i should be independent of her bid. The same
argument is also true for the losers. Ifmax{v1i , v
2
i } < v
∗
i (ri)
and xi(v
1
i , ri) 6= xi(v
2
i , ri), then loser i with higher payment
may misreport. Hence, x˜i and xi should be independent of
buyer’s bid in any IC diffusion auction.
Since x˜i and xi are independent of v
′
i in any IC diffusion
auction, we replace x˜i(v
′
i, ri) and xi(v
′
i, ri) with x˜i(ri) and
xi(ri) for expression convenience. The following lemma fur-
ther deduces that if a diffusion auction is IC, then for every
buyer, her critical payment should be a binding constraint for
her decoupled-payments.
Lemma 3. If a diffusion auction (pi, x) is incentive-
compatible, then for any t and all i, the equation x˜i(ri) −
xi(ri) = v
∗
i (ri) holds.
Proof. Assume there is an IC diffusion auction and x˜i(ri)−
xi(ri) 6= v∗i (ri). Then either x˜i(ri) − xi(ri) > v
∗
i (ri) or
x˜i(ri) − xi(ri) < v∗i (ri). For the former case, the winning
buyer with ti = (v
∗
i (ri), ri) will try to lose by lowering her
bid, since her utility will be increased from v∗i (ri)− x˜i(ri) to
−xi(ri). Similarly, for the latter case, a losing buyer i with
ti = (vi, ri), where x˜i(ri) − xi(ri) < vi < v
∗
i (ri), will
misreport to win since her utility of winning vi − x˜i(ri) is
larger than that of losing−xi(ri). In either case, it contradicts
the assumption.
The last property we want to present is that in an IC dif-
fusion auction, a buyer’s payment should be minimized by
diffusing the sale information to all her neighbors.
Definition 9 (Diffusion-Monotonic Decoupled-Payments).
The two decoupled-payments from x are diffusion-monotonic
if for all i and all t′−i, when r
′′
i ⊆ r
′
i, we have x˜i(v
′
i, r
′′
i ) ≥
x˜i(v
′
i, r
′
i) and xi(v
′
i, r
′′
i ) ≥ xi(v
′
i, r
′
i).
The following lemma guarantees that all IC diffusion auc-
tions possess this diffusion-monotonicity property.
Lemma 4. If a diffusion auction (pi, x) is incentive-
compatible, then the decoupled-payments from x are
diffusion-monotonic.
Proof. Consider an IC diffusion auction and two diffusion
sets r2i ⊆ r
1
i . If x˜i(r
2
i ) < x˜i(r
1
i ), then a winning buyer with
(vi, r
1
i ), where vi ≥ max{v
∗
i (r
1
i ), v
∗
i (r
2
i )}, would misreport
(vi, r
2
i ) since vi − v
∗
i (r
2
i ) > vi − v
∗
i (r
1
i ). This contradicts
IC, thus x˜i(r
2
i ) < x˜i(r
1
i ) is false. Similar argument shows
xi(r
2
i ) < xi(r
1
i ) is also false.
Next, we prove that the above properties together also serve
as a sufficient condition for IC diffusion auctions.
Theorem 2. A diffusion auction (pi, x) is incentive-
compatible if and only if for all type profile t and all i, P1-P4
are satisfied, where
P1 : pi is value-monotonic,
P2 : x˜i and xi are bid-independent,
P3 : x˜i(ri)− xi(ri) = v∗i (ri),
P4 : x˜i and xi are diffusion-monotonic.
Proof. Lemma 1-4 proved the necessity of these four prop-
erties in any IC diffusion auction. Next we prove that if a
mechanism satisfies P1-P4, then it is IC. The proof includes
two steps. The first step shows that the winner has no in-
centives to deliberately become a loser and vise versa. The
second step shows once a buyer’s allocation is determined,
truthfully reporting maximizes her utility .
According to P2, the bids in all x˜i and xi are omitted. If i
is the winner by truthfully reporting, when she misreports to
lose, her utility changes from vi − x˜i(ri) to −xi(r′i), where
r′i ⊆ ri. We have vi− x˜i(ri) ≥ v
∗
i (ri)− x˜i(ri) = −xi(ri) ≥
−xi(r′i), where the left inequality comes from that i wins by
truthfully reporting, the inner equation comes from P3 and
the right inequality comes from P4. Therefore, a winner has
no incentive to misreport to become a loser. If i is a loser by
truthfully reporting, when she misreports to win, her utility
changes from −xi(ri) to vi − x˜i(r′i). We have vi − x˜i(r
′
i) ≤
v∗i (ri)− x˜i(r
′
i) ≤ v
∗
i (ri)− x˜i(ri) = −xi(ri) where the first
inequality comes from P1, the second inequality comes from
P4 and the equation is from P3. Therefore a loser has no
incentive to misreport to win.
Nowwe prove that each kind of buyers maximize their util-
ities by truthfully reporting. A winner’s utility is vi − x˜i(ri).
If she misreports t′i and still wins, her utility becomes vi −
x˜i(r
′
i) which is no more than vi − x˜i(ri) according to P2 and
P4. Also, reporting t′i has a risk of becoming a loser, which is
not beneficial. Therefore it is always an optimal strategy for
the winner to be truthful. Similar arguments also hold for the
losers. In a word, either a buyer wins or loses, being truthful
is always a dominant strategy. That is, P1-P4 is a sufficient
condition for a mechanism to be IC.
Besides IC, as we mentioned earlier in Definition 3, a dif-
fusion auction should also be individually rational (IR) which
guarantees that each buyer’s utility is nonnegative when bid-
ding truthfully.
Theorem 3. An incentive-compatible diffusion auction is in-
dividually rational if and only if for all buyer i and all type
profile t, property P5: xi(∅) ≤ 0 is satisfied.
Proof. Fix t−i, then i’s utility is ui(vi, ri) = pii(vi, ri)(vi −
x˜i(ri))+(1−pii(vi, ri))(−xi(ri)) = pii(vi, ri)(vi−v∗(ri))−
xi(ri), where the last equation comes from P3. IR means
that for any true type (v′i, r
′
i) ∈ R≥0 × P(ri), the inequality
pii(v
′
i, r
′
i)(v
′
i − v
∗(r′i)) − xi(r
′
i) ≥ 0 must hold. This can be
guaranteed when minv′
i
∈R≥0,r
′
i
⊆ri pii(v
′
i, r
′
i)(v
′
i − v
∗(r′i)) −
xi(r
′
i) ≥ 0 holds. By P1, pii(v
′
i, r
′
i) = 1 when v
′
i ≥ v
∗(r′i)
and pii(v
′
i, r
′
i) = 0 when v
′
i < v
∗(r′i), therefore the mini-
mization requires the bid v′i < v
∗(r′i). Then the minimiza-
tion function becomes −xi(r′i). Since xi(r
′
i) is nonincreas-
ing in r′i according to P4, −xi(r
′
i) is minimized by choos-
ing r′i = ∅. Hence, the minimum of ui is −xi(∅), where
ti = (v
′
i < v
∗
i (∅), r
′
i = ∅). Therefore, IR is equivalent to the
property that for each i and each t, xi(∅) ≤ 0 must hold.
The above results present the IC and IR diffusion auctions
in a high-level view, while no details are given for the alloca-
tion and payment policies. Since a diffusion auction can be
very complex, even when the allocation is value-monotonic,
it could be very difficult to obtain the corresponding payment
policy. In the next section, we present a class of more oper-
ational and natural allocation policies, for which an elegant
form of the payment policies can be achieved.
4 Monotonic Allocation and Optimal
Payment
Our design of natural allocation policies is inspired by the fol-
lowing intuition: in the real world, if a person wins in a sale,
she can still win by posting a higher bid; a person who dif-
fuses the sale information to less friends has a better chance
of winning the sale, since some high-bid competitors might
be excluded from the sale. We focus on such allocations.
Formally, given a buyer i, define a partial order ti on
types: (v1i , r
1
i )  (v
2
i , r
2
i ) if and only if v
1
i ≥ v
2
i ∧ r
1
i ⊆ r
2
i .
Definition 10. An allocation policy pi for a diffusion auction
is monotonic if for every type ti with pii(ti, t−i) = 1, we have
that pii(t
′
i, t
′
−i) = 1 for any t
′
i  ti.
This definition is an extension of value-monotonicity in
Definition 7. The following lemma presents a nice property
of monotonic allocation policies, it is a key component of the
results in this section.
Lemma 5. If an allocation policy pi is monotonic, then for
all i and all r′i ⊆ ri, v
∗
i (r
′
i) ≤ v
∗
i (ri).
Proof. Assume there is a monotonic pi such that for two re-
ports t′i = (v
∗
i (ri), r
′
i) and ti = (v
∗
i (ri), ri), where r
′
i ⊆ ri,
it has v∗i (r
′
i) > v
∗
i (ri). In this case, we have t
′
i ≻ ti, how-
ever, pii(t
′
i) = 0 and pii(ti) = 1, which contradicts to the
monotonicity. Thus the assumption is false.
The key observation from Lemma 5 is that under any
monotonic allocation policy, buyer i’s critical bid function
v∗i (ri) is nondecreasing in ri. Recall that in characteriza-
tions of incentive-compatibility, P4 shows both x˜i and xi are
nonincreasing in ri. Moreover, P3 shows x˜i(ri) − xi(ri) =
v∗i (ri). Based on Lemma 5 and the above observations, we
show that any monotonic allocation policy is implementable.
Proposition 2. In diffusion auctions, any monotonic alloca-
tion policy is implementable.
Proof. Remind that a diffusion auction is IR and IC if and
only if for any type profile t−i and any buyer i with (vi, ri),
P1-P5 hold. Given any monotonic allocation policy, P1 is
directly met according to the definitions. Construct two
decoupled-payments as x˜i(ri) = f˜i(v
∗
i (ri)) + hi(t−i) and
xi(ri) = f i(v
∗
i (ri))+hi(t−i), where hi(t−i) is independent
of i’s report, and f˜i(v
∗
i (ri)) and f i(v
∗
i (ri)) are nonincreas-
ing in v∗i (ri), and f˜i(v
∗
i (ri)) − f i(v
∗
i (ri)) = v
∗
i (ri). This
construction for x˜ and x satisfies P2-P4. A possible choice is
f˜i(v
∗
i (ri)) = −αv
∗
i (ri) and f i(v
∗
i (ri)) = −(1 + α)v
∗
i (ri),
where α could be any nonnegative value. Setting hi(t−i) =
(1 + α)v∗i (∅), P5 is also satisfied. Therefore, for any mono-
tonic allocation, there is a payment such that the mechanism
is IR and IC. This completes the proof.
From the proof of Proposition 2, we can see that even when
given a monotonic allocation policy, the space of proper pay-
ment policies could still be very large. For example, x˜i and
xi need not be linear in v
∗
i (ri), they can be any polynomials
with negative coefficients. In the followingwe select payment
policies with respect to the seller’s revenue.
Definition 11. Given a monotonic allocation policy pi and
two payment policies x1, x2 satisfying IR and IC, we say
x1 dominates x2 in the revenue if for any type profile t,
Rev(pi,x
1)(t) ≥ Rev(pi,x
2)(t).
If there exists a payment policy x∗ such that for any type
profile t ∈ T , it dominates all the other payment policies
under IR and IC conditions, then x∗ is optimal with respect
to pi. Our next result shows that for any monotonic allocation
policy, the optimal payment policy exists.
Theorem 4. Given any monotonic allocation policy pi, the
payment policy x∗ = {x∗i = v
∗
i (∅)−v
∗
i (ri)(1−pii(t))}i∈N−s
is optimal.
Proof. Given any type report profile t and a monotonic allo-
cation policy pi, the seller’s revenue can be expressed as
Rev(t) = x˜w(rw) +
∑
i( 6=w)∈N−s
xi(ri),
where w is the winner and i 6= w are the losers. The opti-
mal payment policy x∗ should maximize Rev(t) and (pi, x∗)
should be IR and IC. For all IR and IC mechanisms, P1-P5
should hold. P1 is met by the monotonic allocation. Ac-
cording to P3, x˜w(rw) = xw(rw) + v
∗
w(rw). Substituting
this equation into Rev(t), we get v∗w(rw) +
∑
i∈N−s
xi(ri).
Since the allocation policy is already given, v∗w(rw) is a con-
stant for any t ∈ T . Hence, the objective now is to find
x∗ = argmaxx
∑
i∈N−s
xi(ri) where P2-P5 hold for all
i. Furthermore, since each buyer’s payment policy (x˜i, xi)
is independent of the others’ payment policies, the problem
of searching for argmaxx=(x˜i,xi)
∑
i∈N−s
xi(ri) becomes
solving |N | − 1 independent maximization subproblems:
max
(x˜i,xi)
xi(ri)
s.t. ∀v′i 6= v
′′
i , r
′
i ⊆ ri,
xi(v
′
i, ri) = xi(v
′′
i , ri), (1)
x˜i(ri) = xi(ri) + v
∗
i (ri), (2)
xi(ri) + v
∗
i (ri) ≤ xi(r
′
i) + v
∗
i (r
′
i), (3)
xi(∅) ≤ 0. (4)
Since v∗i (ri) is independent of i’s bid, constraints (1) and
(2) are equivalent to P2. Constraints (2) and (3) together
with Lemma 5 ensure that x˜i and xi are diffusion-monotonic.
Constraint (4) is from P5. Hence, constraints (1)-(4) are
equivalent to P2-P5, provided that pi is monotonic. This
means a solution to the above system is an implementable
allocation that maximizes the seller’s revenue.
According to constraint (3), we must have xi(ri) +
v∗i (ri) ≤ xi(∅) + v
∗
i (∅). Rearranging the order, we have
xi(ri) ≤ xi(∅) + v
∗
i (∅)− v
∗
i (ri).
Note that the left side of this inequality is just one of our
maximization subproblems. Since xi(∅) ≤ 0 according to
constraint (4), we know that xi(ri) is bounded by v
∗
i (∅) −
v∗i (ri)which is a constant with respect to an allocation policy
pi and t. Our finding is that
xi(ri) = v
∗
i (∅)− v
∗
i (ri)
and
x˜i(ri) = xi(ri) + v
∗
i (ri) = v
∗
i (∅)
is a feasible solution and hence the optimal one. To see this,
notice that xi(∅) is always 0 when xi(ri) = v
∗
i (∅) − v
∗
i (ri).
Therefore constraint (4) is satisfied. Since v∗i (ri) is indepen-
dent of v′i and is also nondecreasing in ri, constraints (1) and
(3) are satisfied. Finally, the maximized value of xi(ri) and
the corresponding value of x˜i(ri) are xi(ri) = v
∗
i (∅)−v
∗
i (ri)
and x˜i(ri) = v
∗
i (∅), respectively. That is, charging the win-
ner v∗i (∅) and the losers v
∗
i (∅) − v
∗
i (ri) will maximize the
seller’s revenue. Based on Proposition 1, we have x∗i =
x˜i(ri)pii(t)+xi(ri)(1−pii(t)) = v∗i (∅)−v
∗
i (ri)(1−pii(t)).
Now we complete the proof.
Under the above framework, it is not difficult to ver-
ify that the allocation policies of the recently proposed dif-
fusion auction mechanisms [Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018;
Li et al., 2019] are all monotonic and their payment policies
implicitly satisfy the form in Theorem 4. Especially, the clas-
sic VCG mechanism uses an efficient allocation that is mono-
tonic. [Li et al., 2017] proved that under the diffusion auction
scenario, the VCG mechanism is not budget-balanced, mean-
ing that the seller may have a large deficit. We emphasize
that the payment policy in the VCG mechanism also satisfies
the optimality in Theorem 4. Then we know that if the allo-
cation policy is efficient, then any IR, IC diffusion auction is
not weakly budget-balanced.
Proposition 3. There exists no IR and IC diffusion auction
which is efficient and (weakly) budget-balanced.
Before proving this proposition, we first show that the pay-
ment policy of the VCG mechanism follows Theorem 4.
Lemma 6. In the VCG mechanism, each buyer’s payment
satisfies the from in Theorem 4.
Proof. In the VCG mechanism, the highest bidder wins the
item. Clearly, this allocation policy is monotonic. Each buyer
i in the VCG mechanism pays
xvcgi (t) =W (pi
∗, t \ {ti})− (W (pi
∗, t)− pi∗i (t)vi),
which is interpreted as the social welfare decrease of others
caused by i’s participation. Since there is only one item for
sale, then W (pi∗, t \ {ti}) is the highest bid without i’s par-
ticipation and it exactly equals v∗i (∅). If i does not win, then
the second termW (pi∗, t) − pi∗i (t)vi = W (pi
∗, t) = v∗i (ri).
Otherwise, the second term is 0. Hence, for any buyer i,
x˜vcgi =W (pi
∗, t \ {ti}) = v
∗
i (∅)
and
xvcgi =W (pi
∗, t \ {ti})−W (pi
∗, t) = v∗i (∅)− v
∗
i (ri).
Such a payment policy matches the form in Theorem 4.
Proof of Proposition 3. According to Lemma 6 and Theorem
4, we know that the payment policy in the VCG mechanism
maximizes the seller’s revenue. Since the allocation policy is
efficient and [Li et al., 2017] shows that the VCG mechanism
is not budget balanced, Proposition 3 is true.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we characterize all incentive-compatible dif-
fusion auctions and all implementable allocation polices for
them. Also, given any monotonic allocation policy, the cor-
responding optimal payment policy, which maximizes the
seller’s revenue, is obtained in a simple form. Further stud-
ies on diffusion auction design could potentially be inspired
by this result. An immediate extension is incentive com-
patibility in diffusion auctions where the seller has multi-
ple homogeneous items and each buyer needs at most one
of them [Zhao et al., 2018; Kawasaki et al., 2019]. Beyond
the scope of diffusion auction design, these characteriza-
tions could also be applied to other single-parameter prob-
lems with the following format: each agent i’s type is de-
fined by two parameters, an agent-specific valuation function
vi and an environment-specific parameter zi. vi is defined
by an (publicly known) allocation set Wi for which vi(a) is
a non-negative constant for all a ∈ Wi and vi(a) = 0 for
all a /∈ Wi. zi should be independent of vi and for any
z′i ∈ Zi, ∅  z
′
i  zi, where Zi is the misreport space of
zi and  represents a partial order. For example, the well-
known online mechanism design with no-early arrivals and
no-late departures [Nisan et al., 2007] essentially has similar
underlying structures as diffusion auctions.
References
[Andelman et al., 2005] Nir Andelman, Yossi Azar, and
Motti Sorani. Truthful approximation mechanisms for
scheduling selfish related machines. In Annual Symposium
on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, pages 69–82.
Springer, 2005.
[Archer and Tardos, 2001] Aaron Archer and E´va Tardos.
Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In Pro-
ceedings 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science, pages 482–491. IEEE, 2001.
[Auletta et al., 2004] Vincenzo Auletta, Roberto De Prisco,
Paolo Penna, and Giuseppe Persiano. Deterministic truth-
ful approximation mechanisms for scheduling related ma-
chines. In Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of
Computer Science, pages 608–619. Springer, 2004.
[Bikhchandani et al., 2006] Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit
Chatterji, Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu’alem, Noam Nisan, and
Arunava Sen. Weak monotonicity characterizes determin-
istic dominant-strategy implementation. Econometrica,
74(4):1109–1132, 2006.
[Briest et al., 2005] Patrick Briest, Piotr Krysta, and
Berthold Vo¨cking. Approximation techniques for
utilitarian mechanism design. In Proceedings of the
thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of
computing, pages 39–48. ACM, 2005.
[Clarke, 1971] Edward H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of pub-
lic goods. Public Choice, 11(1):17–33, 1971.
[Groves, 1973] Theodore Groves. Incentives in teams.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages
617–631, 1973.
[Kawasaki et al., 2019] Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanael Bar-
rot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo.
Strategy-proof and non-wasteful multi-unit auction via so-
cial network. arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.08809, 2019.
[Kova´cs, 2005] Annama´ria Kova´cs. Fast monotone 3-
approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines.
In European Symposium on Algorithms, pages 616–627.
Springer, 2005.
[Lavi et al., 2003] Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu’Alem, and Noam
Nisan. Towards a characterization of truthful combinato-
rial auctions. In 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foun-
dations of Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings., pages
574–583. IEEE, 2003.
[Lehmann et al., 2002] Daniel Lehmann, Liadan Ita
Oc´allaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in
approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. Journal
of the ACM (JACM), 49(5):577–602, 2002.
[Li et al., 2017] Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao, and Tao
Zhou. Mechanism design in social networks. In AAAI,
pages 586–592, 2017.
[Li et al., 2018] Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao, and Tao
Zhou. Customer sharing in economic networks with costs.
In IJCAI, pages 368–374, 2018.
[Li et al., 2019] Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao, and
Makoto Yokoo. Diffusion and auction on graphs. In IJ-
CAI, 2019.
[Mu’Alem and Nisan, 2008] Ahuva Mu’Alem and Noam
Nisan. Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted
combinatorial auctions. Games and Economic Behavior,
64(2):612–631, 2008.
[Myerson, 1979] Roger B Myerson. Incentive compatibility
and the bargaining problem. Econometrica: journal of the
Econometric Society, pages 61–73, 1979.
[Myerson, 1981] Roger B. Myerson. Optimal auction de-
sign. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58–73,
1981.
[Nisan et al., 2007] Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, E´va
Tardos, and Vijay V Vazirani. Algorithmic game theory,
volume 16. Cambridge university press, 2007.
[Roberts, 1979] Kevin Roberts. The characterization of im-
plementable choice rules. Aggregation and revelation of
preferences, 12(2):321–348, 1979.
[Rochet, 1987] Jean-Charles Rochet. A necessary and suffi-
cient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear con-
text. Journal of mathematical Economics, 16(2):191–200,
1987.
[Shmoys and Tardos, 1993] David B Shmoys and E´va Tar-
dos. An approximation algorithm for the generalized as-
signment problem. Mathematical programming, 62(1-
3):461–474, 1993.
[Vickrey, 1961] William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auc-
tions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Fi-
nance, 16(1):8–37, 1961.
[Zhao et al., 2018] Dengji Zhao, Bin Li, Junping Xu, Dong
Hao, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Selling multiple items via
social networks. In AAMAS, pages 68–76, 2018.
